By Dr Chanrith Ngin
Honorary Academic, University of Auckland, New Zealand
After Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung attended the Pacific Islands Forum’s opening ceremony as an invited development partner on 01 September 2026, Qian Bo, China’s special envoy for Pacific Island affairs, warned of “consequences”. In response, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stated firmly that the PIF determines its own actions and participants, not any outside country. Yet this response is not as straightforward as it seems. First, the regional bloc does not hold a common position on Taiwan. The presence of Taiwan at this year’s Forum occurred because the host Palau is an American ally and one of three Pacific nations with diplomatic ties to Taiwan. Last year, Taiwan and other non-PIF members were excluded from the summit when the host was Solomon Islands, a Chinese ally. The PIF member states have diverse interests and priorities and thus different ways to balance or navigate superpower rivalry. This diversity was also shown in the absence of the heads of state of Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu at this year’s meeting. The absence of Kiribati’s leader was especially notable. Kiribati and Nauru have close ties to China and reportedly blocked the Forum’s consensus in July on a statement condemning a Chinese missile test into Pacific waters. The test was conducted just a few hours after Australia and Fiji had inked the Ocean of Peace Alliance. However, at the end of the Forum on 04 September, with the exception of Nauru, leaders from the Pacific condemned the test, calling on all states to provide advance warning ahead of such actions.
The geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States and its allies has spurred aid and investment to the region. At the Forum, the United States and Australia committed a combined US$580 million in funding for Pacific Island nations. This funding package focuses on maritime and energy security, law enforcement, and infrastructure, including US$60 million, with US$10 million from New Zealand, to upgrade a port in the Cook Islands. This aid comes amid the rising assistance and investment provided by China to PIF members. China is a major regional donor, providing aid to Pacific Island countries worth about AU$255 million annually, mainly for infrastructure. China is also a key creditor of these nations. Pacific Island nations collectively owe China more than AU$1.3 billion, with Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu holding extremely high debts. Against this economic landscape are various competing security, policing, and defense agreements advanced by both the West and China.
The Taiwan issue has also made its presence felt in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In July 2026, the Chinese embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, told the organisers of the Taiwan Documentary and Film Festival to remove the name and logo of Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture from their posters. The organisers refused, however, telling embassy staff to take their complaint to the Thai foreign ministry. This incident highlights that despite Thailand’s formal stance on “one-China policy”, the kingdom maintains substantial cultural and economic interactions with Taiwan. Indeed, bilateral trade between Thailand and Taiwan reached approximately US$19.4 billion in 2025.
In an interview on 16 August 2026, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said he sees Taiwan as part of China and would not condemn Beijing if peaceful reunification failed and force followed. While China appreciated this remark, it upset Taiwan’s foreign ministry which stated that Anwar had publicly rationalised the use of force against Taiwan and that it could affect trade between Malaysia and Taiwan. Taiwan, Malaysia’s fourth-largest trading partner, engaged in US$54.5 billion of trade in 2025, with a further US$37.1 billion in the first half of 2026.
Like the PIF, ASEAN needs consensus to issue a collective statement and faces equal challenges in doing so. In 2012, Cambodia, as the ASEAN chair, blocked a joint communiqué on the South China Sea for the first time in the organisation’s history as member states disagreed on how to address China’s maritime claims. Cambodia’s refusal to include references to territorial disputes involving China prevented a consensus. China, notably, is a top donor and investor in Cambodia, providing investment worth US$5.42 billion in 2025.
Moreover, despite the formal endorsement of a “one-China policy”, ASEAN has no common position on Taiwan and no procedure for assessing its members’ bilateral agreements with China and the West. This absence of consensus leaves room for members to maneuver the geopolitical field for their own development needs.
In short, members’ diverse interests and strategic choices make it challenging for both the PIF and ASEAN to execute their core strength as a unified bloc and tackle common issues, as originally intended. Amid the decline of the global rules-based order, nations frequently navigate a complex diplomatic tightrope, balancing Western security frameworks with Chinese trade, economic and developmental assistance for their own needs. Geopolitical competition gives individual states space to enhance their agency and leverage to maximise assistance and trade.
Navigating relationships between powerful countries, while balancing trade and aid, can be particularly complex for small and less-developed countries who often depend on larger powers for access to markets, investment, development assistance, security cooperation, and essential goods. At the same time, they may face pressure to align with a powerful country’s political or strategic priorities, even when doing so could strain relations with another. Room to maneuver can therefore be limited, particularly when economic needs, national sovereignty, and long-term development goals do not point in the same direction. Maintaining a careful balance requires pragmatism, flexibility, and a clear assessment of both immediate needs and potential long-term consequences.
During these uncertain times, pragmatic hedging may offer a good approach that New Zealand can learn from. When asked if Taiwan’s foreign minister would be invited to the PIF next year in New Zealand, Foreign Minister Winston Peters stated that New Zealand adheres to the “one-China policy”, which means that New Zealand doesn’t have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and its foreign minister will not be invited despite Taiwan’s observer status at the Forum.
